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Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society: only a democratic civil society 
can sustain a democratic state. (Waltzer, 1990: 9) 
 
Abstract 
 
The ‘third democratic wave’ that rose in the 1990s has receded in many countries, as incum-
bent regimes have manipulated electoral processes and regressive political movements have 
exploited class, ethnic and sectarian antagonism to undermine political order. Such events 
have led many to question the importance of democratic processes. The papers in this special 
section challenge both the uncritical advocates and over-critical naysayers of the third wave 
by treating democratisation as a long-term and contested transition from closed to open ac-
cess societies, where elections represent a necessary but not sufficient mechanism to guaran-
tee representation for excluded groups. The three papers focus on the critical role of civil soci-
ety organisations (CSOs) in securing representation for marginal actors, drawing on the cases 
of Bangladesh and Uganda. In doing so the contributions illustrate the challenges that CSOs 
confront in situations marked by the problems of clientelism, capture and exclusion.  
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Demands for democracy and participation in developing countries have dominated the global govern-
ance agenda since the 1980s, driven by local political movements as well as donors who hope that 
competitive elections will enable people ‘to hold [their] elected representative to account and ‘promote 
inclusion and respect towards people of different ethnic origins, religions, genders, or different opinions 
(UN, Sustainable Development Goal [SDG] #16: 2016).  
 
The ‘third wave of democratisation,” which began in the late 1900s and culminated in the Arab Spring in 
2011, removed or destabilised many authoritarian regimes. It was greeted with great optimism, but 
these hopes have often been disappointed because many incumbent regimes have retained power by 
manipulating elections, and many weak states have failed to meet the complex challenges involved in 
consolidating democratic systems. Indeed, struggles for democratic rights and the onset of electoral 
competition have often intensified sectarian or ethnic antagonisms. Dominant elites in weak or frag-
mented states1 have managed to retain power by capturing representative organisations, exploiting cli-
entelistic linkages, and excluding subordinate classes (Levitsky & Way 2010; World Bank, 2017).  
 
These setbacks are not surprising. Elections have usually been resisted by incumbent elites and their 
supporters, and have usually worked effectively in societies with higher levels of social, economic, and 
political capital than most weak states can muster (Geddes, 1999).2 In a sense, and consistent with 
Waltzer’s observations cited above, many of the outcomes that we hope elections and democracy will 
produce may actually be necessary conditions for elections and democracy to be effective. 
 
Although holding elections is clearly not enough to enhance social inclusion and generate prosperity, we 
would not want to jettison the democratic project altogether, for either normative or practical reasons. 
                                                 
1 ‘Weak states’ lack the capacity to sustain order and deliver services (Clapham, 1996); ‘fragmented states’ may have greater capacity, but 
are characterised by high levels of cultural or economic conflict (Kohli, 2004). 
2 Also see Brett, 2009; 2011; Kohli, 2004; Kurtz, 2013; Linz & Stepan, 1996; North, et. al., 2009; Tilly, 2007; Van der Walle, 2015; Waldner, 
1999. 
After all, while authoritarian rule succeeded in a few strong states, it produced economic breakdowns 
and violent and disruptive conflict in most weak ones. Further; attempts to re-impose ‘traditional institu-
tions,’ as some as some third world radicals and hybridity theorists suggest, could lead to collaboration 
with ‘dubious non-state orders’ and could also ‘risk eroding local legitimacy and consent … [and allow] 
‘violent or oppressive social practices [to] become embedded in officially recognized governance sys-
tems’; (Meagher, et. al., 2014: 4/5). And with democracy supported by ‘almost 90 percent of respond-
ents worldwide [who] view free and fair elections as an important instrument for improving economic 
conditions in their country’ (World Bank, 2017, Ch 8), efforts to curtail democratization will only generate 
more unrest. Demands for participation and democracy are not going away; these are inevitable re-
sponses to corruption, bureaucratic failure, and to the increasing inequality and unemployment created 
by the destructive impact of global competition. Hence the question that confronts us now is not ‘wheth-
er one could obtain aristocracy or democracy, but rather whether one would have a democratic society 
advancing … with order and morality; or else a democratic society that was disordered and corrupt’, as 
de Tocqueville argued long ago (1835/1971: 149).   
 
Taking a step back, ‘world history’, has produced multiple transitions from situations where 'one is free' 
to those where 'some are free', and, hopefully, eventually to those where 'all men (sic.) as such are free, 
and ... man is by nature free' (Hegel, 1822-30/1975: 54). And increasing freedom in weak authoritarian 
states has always threatened the wealth and power of existing elites, has been heavily contested, and 
often suffered serious reversals. The recurrent democratic waves that have transformed the modern 
world suggest that the forces that allow freedom to trump dictatorship are more powerful than those that 
block it, but persistent setbacks also show that democratisation is not a teleological inevitability.  
 
The current crisis encourages us to think about democratic capacities that can be partially created be-
fore democracy is introduced, and subsequently built through ‘complex and lengthy historical processes’ 
afterwards (Karl and Schmitter, 1994: 180; Lipset, 1959). When these processes of capacity construc-
tion begin in authoritarian societies, they can create what North et. al. (2009) call the ‘doorstep condi-
tions’ that enable them to move from closed, to intermediate to open societies. And these processes 
are, undeniably, taking place almost everywhere, through improvements in communication and human, 
social, and economic capital, and the spread of liberal capitalism. These processes have intensified 
pressure from excluded groups and have turned most societies into intermediate societies, where the 
demand for competitive elections has already been conceded (van der Walle, 2015; Carothers, 2007; 
2002). Consolidating these democratic transitions, in turn, and deepening democracy, therefore de-
pends on the ability of excluded social groups to represent their own interests, strengthen their econom-
ic capacities, and oblige dominant elites to implement progressive policy programmes by enabling them 
to build what North et. al. (2009: 26, 152) call ‘perpetually lived organisations’, that is to say, impersonal 
organisations that are sufficiently institutionalised to outlive their individual members.   
 
Representative Organisations and Political Agency in Competitive Authoritarian States 
 
Building on these insights, the articles in this special section offer a corrective to both the uncritical ad-
vocates and over-critical naysayers of the third wave, treating it as a heavily contested and long-term 
process. Democracy depends on parties that compete for power at the ballot box, and also civil society 
organizations (CSOs), such as social and political movements, pressure groups, and non-governmental 
organizations. CSOs are ‘an an essential ingredient in both democratization and the health of estab-
lished democracies’ (Foley and Edwards, 1996: 38: Faguet, 2012: Putnam, 1993) because they enable 
groups of all kinds to articulate demands and influence how elected rulers and state officials exercise 
power, and they play multiple political roles in authoritarian and democratic societies.  
 
Of course attention to CSOs is not new. Scholars have celebrated their role in challenging authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Foweraker, 1995; Tarrow, 1994), for example, identified 
them as a key mechanism for representing the poor with donor support (Clark, 2002), and they are seen 
as essential for ‘bottom-up development’ processes (Chambers, 1997; 1983; Nelson & Wright, 1995; 
Uphoff, 1992).The studies in this special section show how CSOs’ ability to perform these desired func-
tions are contested by existing elites and can be distorted by power asymmetries that undergird authori-
tarian regimes. The case studies provide detailed evidence of the same problems of clientelism, capture 
and exclusion identified by the World Development Report (2017).  
 
David Lewis analyses clientelism and the marginalisation of political organizations in Bangladesh. The 
article examines the activities of political NGOs in Bangladesh and identifies some important successes, 
but attributes their long-term failure to three factors - an institutional setting dominated by clientelistic 
structures; a shift in donor support from mobilisation to market-based service delivery agencies; and 
internal structures and external relationships that encouraged elite capture, co-option and personalised 
leadership. 
Bangladesh shifted from democratic to military rule in 1975, and back to democracy in 1990, followed by 
regular elections contested by two major parties that alternated in power until this process was disrupted 
by a military-backed caretaker government in 2006-7, but followed by elections in 2008. The country has 
therefore operated as a formal democracy, but regular elections have been superimposed on illiberal 
values and structures that have produced a system of “rotating plunder” that has created a limited de-
gree of stability, but turned democracy ‘into a façade. Both parties have refused to act as a ‘loyal’ oppo-
sition by resorting to boycotts, strikes, protests, and political violence when they lose, and depend on 
patron-client relationships to reward supporters and maintain alliances with dominant elites.  
Donors have supported successive governments and service delivery NGOs, but also helped radical 
activists to create politically oriented NGOs committed to overcoming the structural causes of poverty 
and exclusion and facilitate ‘people’s self-development’ (Rahman, 1993) in the 1970s and 1980s. These 
activsts used NGOs to evade the military regime’s limits on open political competition, and because par-
ties were compromised by their reliance on vertical clientalistic systems. They formed village level 
groups to strengthen the economic and political capacities of the poor; tried to link them into wider net-
works and federations; and to influence the government through policy advocacy.  
Paradoxically, they were most effective under the military regime because they did not threaten its au-
thority, and helped to promoting pro-poor policies that helped it legitimise itself. However, their success-
es depended on ‘top down’ advocacy and reformist elite networking, not political mobilisation, because 
they could not resist the violent sanctions that followed confrontations with local power structures, or 
build horizontal ties within vertically structured rural societies.  
Democratisation should have strengthened their influence, but their ability to mobilise support threat-
ened the clientalistic relationships that sustained a political system where parties depended on patron-
age distribution and could co-opt NGO leaders, and the poor depended on vertical links with local elites 
rather that horizontal links with each other. An authoritarian cultural environment, privileged access to 
donor resources, and links to the external patronage system enabled NGO leaders to undermine inter-
nal democratic processes and stakeholder accountability with only one exception. A decline in donor 
support from mobilisation to development NGOs, compounded by their internal failures, then virtually 
eliminated the political NGO sub-sector with one significant exception. Lewis’s article thus speaks to the 
challenges of building and sustaining democratic capacities even in the context of increased electoral 
competition. 
 
Tom Goodfellow analyzes organisational Capture in Uganda. The Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers 
Association (UTODA) was set up to represent owners and operatives, and regulate and maintain public 
transport services in Kampala. It should have strengthened democratic processes, but Goodfellow 
shows that it was captured by its leadership and the political-economic elites who straddled the state-
society divide and created new structures of authoritarianism and elite collusion instead. This under-
mined urban services and popular representation more generally and led to the organisation’s downfall 
in 2011 and the reassertion of top-down state control. 
Thousands of mini-busses provide public transport in Kampala, and were generating more than $100 
million a year by 2009. Ownership is widely dispersed, but many owners control large vehicle fleets. 
UTODA collected welfare payments for drivers, and fees to enable the City Council to maintain the taxi 
parks. By 2009 it was collecting $24 million from fees, but transferring less than $5 million to the City, 
and had spectacularly failed to fulfil its obligations to its members or the city, but it had protected taxi 
owners and provided massive rents to its secretariat. 
These immense profits and rents meant that UTODA was unable to insulate itself from national political 
power struggles. It allied itself with the ruling party, and many leading politicians profited from large taxi 
fleets. The government gave it monopoly powers that were then protected by a tight web of political and 
economic interests that enabled it to exploit its operatives, withhold taxes, allow taxi-parks to deterio-
rate, and ignore congestion and dangerous driving for over two decades.   
Goodfellow attributes these failures to the weak internal accountability mechanisms that allowed owners 
and officials to dominate workers, but especially to collusive relationships between UTODA’s leaders 
and the state. Rather than a unidirectional process in which societal interests ‘capture’ the state, he 
treats this as a two-step process of ‘double capture’ in which UTODA was first captured by government 
interests, followed by the emergence of independent interests in the organisation that enabled it to dom-
inate government policy.  
 He then attributes the instability of this elite settlement to the fact that it generated both collusion and 
conflict with different parts of the state. UTODA’s failures produced serious public anger and chronic 
conflict with the opposition-controlled City Council. The government responded by replacing the elected 
Council with an appointed City Authority and removing UTODA’s authority and fees. This eliminated a 
dysfunctional organisation, but in the absence of any democratic foundations or alternative bottom-up 
organisations to build upon in the sector, led to the government reasserting top-down control and further 
undermining the possibility of a democratic alternative. 
While Lewis and Goodfellow both illustrate the challenges and limitations to CSOs’ efforts to secure 
greater representation, King & Hickey’s article points to the possibilities of greater success. These au-
thors show how a local donor funded NGO and a farmer cooperative in rural Uganda reduced the politi-
cal and economic exclusion of small farmers in rural Uganda by enabling them to build new trust net-
works, cross-class alliances, and encourage synergistic relations between civil and political society. 
They use Tilly’ theorisation of ‘democratisation as process’ to show how they strengthened their political 
agency in conditions of socio-economic inequality and contested state-society relations in a semi-
authoritarian, neo-patrimonial and predominantly agrarian society.  
Uganda has had regular elections since 1986, but the regime uses public resources and manipulates 
shifting power relations between political elites, and elites and more popular actors to retain power and 
subvert democratic processes. Ugandan smallholders do not depend on landlords but have been sys-
tematically excluded from public politics and formal markets, and subjected to hierarchical social struc-
tures and clientelist relations with local politicians and civil servants that Tilly (2007) calls ‘categorical 
inequalities’.  
These processes have forced the rural poor to rely on informal economic and social relationships that 
Tilly describes as ‘segregated trust networks’ to survive. He argues that these block their ability to con-
solidate democratic transitions until they can find ways to integrate them into public politics. King and 
Hickey review the literature exploring the role of a wide range of solidaristic organisations – co-
operatives, parent teacher associations, churches, and local NGOs supported by foreign NGOs – that 
have done this, and then document the activities of two successful Ugandan organisations. 
The first is a professionalised development NGO run by local elites and financed by donors. It supported 
democratisation through rights and governance training, created deliberative spaces, leadership retreats 
and policy research to foster positive relationships between civil, state and political elites. It could not 
incorporate local citizens into formal participatory processes governing service delivery, but did bring 
non-state elites in local planning and budgetary processes.  
The second is a coffee marketing and savings co-operative that mobilizes smallholders through house-
hold-to-household conscientisation. It created a reputation for efficiency, trustworthiness, and high quali-
ty coffee, gave farmers better prices, and increased household income, savings levels, and socio-
economic mobility.  
This study shows that these organisations did not challenge national power structures, but also that they 
did help excluded communities to challenge categorical inequalities and encourage political and eco-
nomic engagement and suggests that smallholder forms of collective action could play a more progres-
sive role in making democratic developmental advances rather than more professionalised/de Tocque-
vllian forms of civil society. It therefore provides us with a useful corrective to overly-elitist and pessimis-
tic evaluations of the challenges confronting ‘bottom up’ development, by demonstrating that building 
capacity within informal institutions, and strengthening channels of influence with external organisations 
can strengthen their capacity ‘organise and demand political and social rights’ enhancing the likelihood 
that ‘distributional conflicts’ can be ‘peacefully mediated’ (Sandbrook et al., 2007). 
To summarize, we live in a world marked by deep and persistent desires to consolidate the democratic 
rights of the poor, but where efforts to do so in many competitive authoritarian states remain compro-
mised by clientelism, capture and exclusion. The strength of the democratic imperative that dominates 
contemporary political discourse is undeniable, but the challenges that democratic overcome through 
long-term and heavily contested processes designed to strengthen state and economic capacities in 
these societies, and especially to create strong and responsible representative organisations that ena-
ble the poor to play an equal part in negotiating the compromises between conflicting interests on which 
peace, stability and political cohesion always depend. It is the latter phenomena, the creation and mobi-
lization of CSOs, that is the focus of this special section. The three articles that follow provide us with 
important insights about the processes, and the challenges that ongoing attempts to achieve these 
goals have confronted in competitive authoritarian states. These include the complex threat to autono-
mous pro-poor organisations posed by competitive politics in societies dominated by vertically integrat-
ed clientelistic relationships and the way electoral competition can intensify problems of elite capture of 
representative associations, but also how the leadership of intellectuals and support by foreign donors 
can create organisations that mobilise and represent marginalised and atomised actors.  
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